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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT
Wilful Failure to Pay Income Taxes as Grounds for Disbarment. The court in
In re Seijas, 151 Wash. Dec. 350, 318 P.2d 961 (1957), held that an attorney convicted
under section 145 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 could be disbarred by the
summary procedure provided for in Rule 18, Washington Supreme Court Rules for
Discipline of Attorneys, 34A Wn.2d.
Section 145(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "Any person required
under this chapter to collect, account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this chapter,
who wilfully fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, and any
person who wilfully attempts in any manner to evade or default any tax imposed by
this chapter or the payment thereof, shall.., be guilty of a felony...." Rule 18 of
Rules for Discipline of Attorneys, 34A Wn.2d, provides that "... where a final convic-
tion involves moral turpitude, the board of governors may, by a summary proceeding
... recommend to the supreme court the disbarment of the member so convicted."
The Washington court did not attempt to make an independent determination of
whether a "wilful" failure to pay income taxes was an offense involving moral turpi-
tude, but considered the federal cases as controlling on this issue. In addition, follow-
ing the lead of the federal courts, the Washington court confined its inquiry to the
record of conviction, consisting of the indictment, plea, verdict and sentence. The court
felt that Tsueng Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957), fairly stated the federal
rule. In the Tsueng Chu case the court held that a violation of section 145(b) of the
revenue code is an offense involving moral turpitude, and a conviction under 145(b)
necessitates a finding that the accused has fraudulently attempted to evade the payment
of income tax.
Since the defendant in the present case was charged and convicted of wilfully filing
a fraudulent return, the Tsueng Chu case is precisely in point. Thus the Washington
court, by accepting the Tsueng Chu v. Cornell decision, held that a conviction under
145(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 involved moral turpitude and the use
of the summary procedure by the board of governors was proper.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Mutual Observance by Spouses of Separate Property Agreements.
In Kolmorgan v. Sckaller, the Washington supreme court set up two
distinct tests to prove the validity of a separate property agreement
between a husband and wife making the earnings of one spouse his
or her separate property. The court said ... the proponents of such
agreements must establish by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the
existence of the agreement ... and (2) that the agreement has been
mutually observed by the spouses. .."
Mr. Scholler was unemployed from August, 1953 to March, 1956.
During this period Mrs. Scholler's income was used to pay the com-
munity expenses and obligations. On January 13, 1954, Mr. and
Mrs. Scholler filed a written separate property agreement with the
1 151 Wash. Dec. 79, 316 P.2d 111 (1957).
2 151 Wash. Dec. at 82, 316 P.2d at 113.
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